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The scale of Flemish municipalities keeps dominating the 
political agenda in Flanders. In recent years the Flemish 
government has stimulated the municipalities to merge 
on a voluntary basis. If they do so, they can receive more 
competences and strengthen their position. However, this 
policy has not generated any success so far. In this paper 
the authors place these efforts in a historical perspective, 
before addressing the current policy in Flanders concern-
ing scale and decentralisation. In the final part of the paper 
the authors introduce some foreign experiences with scale 
and decentralisation. It is remarkable that the current de-
bate in Flanders does not stand on its own. The authors try 
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to determine what lessons Flanders can learn from these 
foreign experiences. 
Keywords: local government, scale, decentralisation, cen-
tral-local relations, amalgamations 
1.  Introduction
Those who occasionally watch television have undoubtedly noticed that 
several channels replay different programmes. The same happens with co-
alition agreements. They often contain recipes that have already emerged 
in former policy documents or coalition agreements. The fact that a recipe 
is repeated can be interpreted in two ways: either it has been a successful 
way of dealing with certain problems, which explains why it is being re-
peated, or the measure was never put into practice and one wants to give 
it another try.
The same can be said when we speak of the enlargement of the adminis-
trative scale, which is mentioned in various policy documents of the cur-
rent Flemish government (2014-2019). The enlargement of the admin-
istrative scale is explicitly put forward as a major priority of the current 
Flemish policy in the policy declaration on internal administration and 
urban affairs. However, this was also the case during the previous legis-
lature (2009-2014). In this contribution we therefore examine what hap-
pened during the previous legislature and what plans the current Flemish 
government has in this field. We focus in particular on the administrative 
scale of Flemish municipalities. Finally, we broaden our focus by discuss-
ing some foreign examples of recent scale reforms and see what lessons 
Flanders can draw from them.
2.  A Brief History Lesson: Scale in Flanders in 
Recent Decades  
Although the borders of certain Belgian municipalities date from the Ro-
man period, it was mostly during the French period – many years later 
– that some uniformity was brought to our state structure, including at 
the local level (De Ceuninck, 2009). At that time, however, small-scale 
local government was the norm. The administrative boundaries of mu-



























nicipalities coincided with the world of the people. A larger scale was not 
immediately necessary, since the tasks of former municipalities were also 
much more limited than they are today. From the creation of Belgium in 
1830 (when the country had 2,498 municipalities) until well into the 20th 
century, the scale of local authorities and their borders was barely a topic 
of discussion, let alone a subject of reform.
It would take until 1937 for the scale of Belgian municipalities to come 
under discussion. In that year the former Study Centre for the Reform of 
the State launched a proposal in which they called for a compulsory amal-
gamation of all municipalities with fewer than 500 inhabitants and an 
optional amalgamation of all municipalities with between 500 and 1,000 
inhabitants. The Second World War, however, led to other administrative 
and political priorities, so it would take until the 1950s for the issue to 
appear on the political agenda again. In 1959 the Central Council for the 
Economy formulated an opinion in which it declared that the extensive lo-
cal fragmentation in Belgium generated numerous drawbacks. Therefore 
they called for an extensive amalgamation of all Belgian municipalities 
with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants, along with a serious expansion of in-
termunicipal cooperation initiatives.
Eventually, in 1961, the legislator recognised that something had to be 
done to reduce the large number of small municipalities. The Law of Feb-
ruary 14, 1961 “for economic expansion, social progress, and financial 
recovery” contained a relatively smooth procedure to amalgamate mu-
nicipalities by means of a Royal Decree. This law was an attempt by the 
government to deal with the structural weaknesses of the Belgian econo-
my at that time. Municipal mergers were part of this package. Eventual-
ly, on the basis of that procedure, about 300 municipalities disappeared 
between 1961 and 1971, which brought the total number of Belgian mu-
nicipalities down to 2,379.1
Soon afterwards, the government realised that the amalgamations of the 
1960s were inadequate in both quantity and quality. The total number 
of municipalities involved in a merger was too low and the newly creat-
ed municipalities remained relatively small. In response, in July 1971 the 
Parliament voted in two laws, namely the Law of July 23 “concerning 
the amalgamation of municipalities and the modification of their bound-
1 Most of these amalgamations took place in the Walloon part of the country, where 
local fragmentation was much higher than in Flanders. Two amalgamations worth mention-
ing were the creation of the city of Oudenaarde that amalgamated with several of its sur-
rounding municipalities in 1964, and the creation of the city of Bruges in 1970. 








aries” and the Law of July 26 “on federation and agglomeration”. The 
first act made municipal amalgamations possible in Belgium according 
to an overall plan, while the second law wanted to create federations and 
agglomerations as a second tier of local government. It could be seen as 
an enforced way of intermunicipal cooperation.  However, it would take 
until 1974 for the law on amalgamations to be put into practice. At the 
same time, the law on federations and agglomerations died a quiet death.
When Joseph Michel became minister for the interior in the Tindemans 
I government in 1974, his first job was to implement the government 
decision on municipal amalgamations based on the law from 1971. This 
meant that municipal amalgamations would be implemented in accord-
ance with an overall plan in which almost all Belgian municipalities were 
involved. Those mergers were motivated in several ways, but the main rea-
son was undoubtedly to make local authorities financially healthy again. 
Both small rural municipalities and larger cities faced a difficult financial 
situation at that time. The first category did not have enough tax revenues 
to build a sound policy, while larger cities, in their turn, felt locked up 
within their historical boundaries. That meant that their metropolitan role 
in delivering many services to their own citizens (but also to citizens from 
surrounding municipalities) was insufficiently respected. Their main prob-
lem was that they could not raise taxes in those surrounding areas, while 
many of the residents of those areas used some of the services provided by 
the cities. In addition to this financial motivation for the amalgamations, 
the government also wanted to put an end to the huge local fragmentation 
at that time and to open the way for additional powers and competences 
at the local level. A decentralisation of new competences towards the local 
level was planned after the amalgamations. The amalgamations that were 
decided in 1974-75 would effectively start in 1976. 
As mentioned before, the mergers of 1976 were carried out according to 
an overall plan in which the decision-making was strongly controlled by 
the central government (De Ceuninck, 2009). The minister of the interior 
formulated merger proposals to the municipalities in question, but the 
latter could only formulate advice in response to those proposals. Finally, 
it was the central government, partly based on the advice it received, that 
decided on the new municipal boundaries. This way of decision-making 
was a major source of criticism after the reform. Many local politicians felt 
that their advice had had little or no impact. This way of working resulted 
in the fact that for many years the subject of municipal mergers was vir-
tually taboo in Belgium. In many municipalities it took a long time before 
the amalgamations were accepted by everyone.



























The amalgamations of 1976 reduced the number of Belgian municipalities 
from 2,379 to 589.2 In Flanders the number of municipalities decreased 
by 66%; from 906 to 308 municipalities. In Wallonia, the drop was even 
steeper (82%). Due to many linguistic and other problems, no municipal 
amalgamations were implemented in the capital region of Brussels. As a 
result, Brussels still has 19 municipalities.
3.  Scale as Part of a Larger Debate
The mentioned taboo resulted in the fact that the issue of scale and amalga-
mations remained undiscussed for a long time in Flanders. Over the last two 
decades, however, things have been changing. It is worth noting to see that 
the debate on scale in Flanders has become part of a wider debate, especially 
the one on the administrative relationship between the three directly elected 
levels of government in Flanders. The latter debate can indeed be seen as a 
permanent search between the three levels of government to optimise ad-
ministrative relations. That quest was intensified after 2001, when Flanders 
became responsible for the organisation of local and provincial government 
levels. Before, this had been a responsibility of the federal government.
The search can also be explained logically. Administrative relations evolve 
over time along with the levels of government, whose tasks and compe-
tences, together with the legal framework in which they function, are also 
permanently subject to change. Furthermore, one needs to think about 
the evolution of administrative relationships in Flanders and how to deal 
with this. Over the years the municipalities have gained many more com-
petences and responsibilities, which has resulted in the fact that nowadays 
they have a different position compared with the Flemish government 
then was the case many years ago.
3.1.  From CBO-Advice to the White Paper
In the following part we take a closer look at the different initiatives in 
which the Flemish government and the local (and sometimes provincial 
government) discussed their relations and their mutual cooperation (De 
Ceuninck, 2014). This overview demonstrates that both the issues of scale 
2 Note that the amalgamation of the city of Antwerp only took place in 1982, but is 
included in this number. 
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and decentralisation were, despite ups and downs, important elements 
during these debates.3
Advice from the Committee on Government Organisation. The opinion of the 
Committee on Government Organisation came in 1997 at the request 
of Minister Peeters, who was at that time responsible for home affairs, 
urban policy, and housing. The task of the committee was to formulate 
an opinion on the future organisation of Flemish local government, and 
in particular the relationship between the municipalities and the Flemish 
government level. It should be noted that the advice dates from the period 
when the federal government was still responsible for the operation and 
the organisation of local and provincial governments.
The strengthening of municipal administrative power was explicitly put 
forward by the committee. According to the committee, there were prob-
lems in Flanders with the administrative power of all municipalities with 
fewer than 10,000 inhabitants: at that time one third of Flemish munici-
palities. Voluntary mergers were, according to the committee, necessary 
and possibly followed by compulsory amalgamations at a later stage. In 
addition, the committee was in favour of a stronger differentiation in tasks 
between municipalities. Greater diversity among municipalities ensures 
that they are able to fulfil their own responsibilities according to their 
specific characteristics. According to the committee, an additional way 
of strengthening municipal administrative power was the stimulation of 
intermunicipal cooperation. Especially in rural areas, this was seen as a 
way of strengthening municipal administrative power. The committee also 
held a plea for a new decree to shape this intermunicipal cooperation. The 
legal framework which had existed previously was indeed too rigid, leaving 
many municipalities to cooperate outside the existing legal framework of 
intermunicipal cooperation.
Specifically, for urban areas, the committee pointed out many difficulties 
with regard to distribution and redistribution issues. In many cases (espe-
cially regarding spatial planning) those issues were a competence of the 
second tier of local government: the provinces. If those powers were to be 
decentralised towards a city regional level, things would probably be eas-
ier to organise. According to the committee, a city regional scale would 
contribute to a more effective and efficient regional urban management, 
3 In this overview we make use of the text Evaluation of the Internal Flemish State Re-
form, written by the Centre for Local Politics in close cooperation with the Flemish Advisory 
Council for Administrative Affairs (De Ceuninck, 2014).
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better equalisation of the uneven distribution of benefits and burdens 
between the municipalities, better policy coordination, and more demo-
cratic control by the residents of these urban areas. Finally, following this 
logic (and with the installation of such a new layer of government), the 
provinces would cease to exist in those urban areas.
Pact with the municipalities. One year after the advice of the Committee 
on Government Organisation, the Flemish government started negotia-
tions with the Flemish municipalities, which culminated in a pact that was 
reached in March 1999. The central objective of this pact with the munici-
palities was to improve public services and achieve a greater citizen involve-
ment by strengthening local democracy. The government hoped to achieve 
this by investing primarily in larger policy coherence. The Flemish govern-
ment committed itself to strive for better cooperation between the different 
Flemish administrations in order to strengthen relations with the munici-
palities. Although the scale debate was not a part of these negotiations, the 
pact is still worth noting. Many things that were agreed at that time are still 
relevant today and have even reappeared in the political discourse.
The negotiations between the local authorities and the Flemish govern-
ment finally resulted in a ten-point action plan that specified 63 concrete 
action points. It showed clearly that the Flemish government chose to re-
spect the principle of subsidiarity. This was reflected in the fact that choic-
es had to be made at the most functional government level. The Flemish 
government saw a role for itself in policy formulation. They stressed that 
they would only formulate the outlines of a policy and the intended re-
sults, while a more concrete completion of the policy would be a task for 
the local level. In addition, the pact also explicitly recognised the need for 
prior and timely consultation on important matters that would affect both 
central and local partners, and initiatives that would benefit their mutual 
communication and information exchange.
The debate on core competences. The debate on core competences was initi-
ated by the Flemish Dewael government (1999-2003), which announced 
in its policy declaration a reorganisation of Flemish government organi-
sation. As a result of the Lambermont Agreement of 2001, the regions 
had indeed acquired responsibility over the operation and organisation 
of local and provincial governments.4 This was an excellent opportunity 
4 The Lambermont Agreement was a step in a succession of steps of state reform in 
Belgium. It was reached in 2000-2001 and was actually the fifth step in the process. The 
agreement decentralised several competences concerning local authorities to the regions 
and decided on a considerable increase of federal transfers to the communities.
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to observe their operation in detail. The debate focused clearly on the 
vertical dimension of the management organisation, namely the division 
of powers between the three levels of government in Flanders (Devos and 
Reynaert, 2002).
The debate eventually centred on two questions, the first of which was: 
which competences have a public interest and should therefore be taken 
up by the government? Once that question was answered, one could an-
swer the second question: namely what level of government should take 
up which public function? However, this needs some nuance. The first 
question was never really answered, while the second was often narrowed 
down to a discussion of financial resources between the partners involved 
in the debate.
The debate was conducted from the perspective of the citizen. Departing 
from a government perspective would have been wrong because each level 
of government strives for the defence of its own interests. The debate was 
conducted between December 2001 and April 2003 by politicians of the 
three levels of government in Flanders, namely the municipalities, the 
provinces, and the Flemish government. Apart from the citizens’ perspec-
tive, the subsidiarity principle was also put forward as a guiding principle 
during the discussions. This referred to the fact that tasks which could be 
performed by a lower level of government should not be taken up by a 
higher level of government. If it were decided otherwise, then this should 
be adequately justified.
The debate ultimately resulted in an agreement between the three levels 
of government elected in Flanders, where a clear profile was created for 
each of these levels. The municipalities were thereby recognised as the 
basic level, closest to the citizens. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, 
the local level could take up any competence without limitation. Munici-
palities can perform all tasks related to their territorial importance, except 
in cases where this is legally prohibited, or in cases where the tasks are 
legally (or by decree) reserved for another level of government. Note, of 
course, that the principle of subsidiarity and further development of local 
authorities means that the other tiers of government should exercise a 
restraint position towards the local government level.
Remarkably, some issues remained absent from the debate on core com-
petences (Devos and Reynaert, 2002). Reynaert and Devos pointed out 
that the core problem of the administrative organisation in Flanders, 
namely the scale of the municipalities, was left out of the debate: “The 
majority of the Flemish municipalities do not have sufficient policy ca-
13



























pacity to take on many complex tasks. But nobody dares to say the words 
‘amalgamations of municipalities’”. Note that the taboo on new municipal 
mergers was still alive at the beginning of this century. This would, howev-
er, change during the Flemish legislature of 2009-2014, in which the scale 
of municipalities was explicitly questioned.
The internal Flemish state reform. In the Flemish coalition agreement of 
July 9, 2009, the political parties made  it clear that they wanted to work 
towards a simplification of the administrative landscape in Flanders. In-
deed, the analysis was that over the years too many intermediate policy 
structures had emerged. The government wanted to tackle this so-called 
administrative overload by means of an internal state reform. This process 
would lead to a simplification of the administrative landscape in which all 
forms of governance would be scrutinised and, where necessary, would be 
reformed or even abolished. From now on, the focus would lie on the mu-
nicipalities on the one hand, and the Flemish government on the other. 
The government announced the intention to limit the list of the compe-
tences of Flemish provinces drastically to only ground-tied competences 
such as economy, agriculture, environment, spatial planning, and so on. 
Most competences that are person-tied (such as culture, education, and 
sports) would be transferred to the regional or local level. Only in excep-
tional cases would some of these competences still be attributed to the 
provinces (Valcke, 2010; Bourgeois, 2011).
These general principles were further refined in the policy declaration of 
Minister Bourgeois, who was responsible for internal affairs during the 
previous Flemish legislature. In an analysis he outlined the particular-
ly complex administrative landscape in Flanders. He indicated that he 
would focus on a drastic simplification of the many structures within the 
Flemish administrative landscape. The key elements he included were:
The focus of the policy would lie with the municipalities and the Flemish 
government. All forms of intermediate governance would be questioned.
A decentralisation towards the local level. The Flemish government would 
invest in their administrative power.
There would be a comprehensive list of provincial powers with a territorial 
character.
The creation of homogeneous key tasks for each level of government. 
Only two administrative levels should play a role per policy sector.
The many intermediate structures and organs between existing govern-
ment levels would be simplified dramatically.
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With the announcement of these policy priorities a major taboo in Flem-
ish policy disappeared, namely new municipal amalgamations. The min-
ister was very clear about this; investing in the capacity of municipalities 
could also be done by way of new municipal amalgamations (Bourgeois, 
2010a). In his Green Paper (July 2010), the minister made this very clear: 
“Scaling up of local governments through mergers is one possible way of 
enhancing the administrative capacity of many municipalities. A large-
scale top-down approach, where the number of municipality inhabitants 
is taken as a guiding criterion, is currently not on the agenda. The need 
to scale up will have to be examined case by case and will have to offer a 
solution to the specific problems of the municipalities involved. Here we 
can think of a redistribution problem (e.g. between a city and its surround-
ings), an imperfect amalgamation of the past, increasing administrative 
efficiency and capacity, the professionalisation of the administration ... It 
is important that an amalgamation is seen in the long term; this must be 
a structural solution with sufficient support among local politicians and 
the local population.”
Further development of these principles came with the so-called White 
Paper of April 2011 (Bourgeois, 2011). Again, this text was clearly in fa-
vour of new municipal amalgamations. They were explicitly promoted as a 
way of strengthening the professionalisation of local government. Several 
foreign experiences were used to underpin this. Moreover, it demonstrat-
ed that local democracy does not necessarily suffer under a larger scale. 
The example of Denmark was specifically highlighted as a successful ex-
ample of an amalgamation operation that went hand in hand with decen-
tralisation towards the local level.
A concrete implementation of this policy came with the framework for 
voluntary mergers which was published by Minister Bourgeois (2010b). It 
contained a concrete path that was developed to allow voluntary mergers, 
with a deadline before the local elections of October 2012. It was up to 
the councils themselves to take a decision in principle on this, which could 
afterwards be confirmed by a decree. The minister worked out two stim-
ulative measures to make the offer slightly more attractive. First, there 
was a financial bonus for those municipalities that took the step towards 
amalgamation. A grant was calculated so that during the first local legisla-
ture (which is six years in Belgium) after the merger, the new municipality 
would annually receive extra financial support. Secondly, the framework 
also provided non-financial guidance and support. The minister suggested 
the installation of a technical working group which was to assist the mu-
nicipalities during the merger process. This coaching team would consist 
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of representatives of the municipalities involved, officials of the (Flemish) 
Agency for Internal Administration, employees of the VVSG5, and the 
governor. The task of this team would be to support the municipalities 
legally and organisationally.
With both measures, the Flemish government showed that they did not 
wish to make the same mistakes as those made  during the amalgama-
tions of the 1970s. At that time, the municipalities were indeed forced 
to merge and there was hardly any public participation. Moreover, the 
municipalities had had the impression that they had been left alone and 
received very little administrative support. Finally, it had also been a com-
mon complaint that the municipalities had had to pay the majority of the 
merger costs themselves. With this framework for voluntary mergers there 
came an answer to all of those complaints. From now on, voluntary merg-
ers would receive both financial and technical support from the Flemish 
government.
In reality, however, nothing really happened. There have indeed been 
some exploratory talks in some municipalities, but ultimately no one has 
taken a step towards an actual merger. There are several reasons for this 
(Decoster, 2014). The main reason is undoubtedly the lack of support 
for voluntary mergers. Local politicians are especially reluctant towards 
new mergers. In part this is due to the unfortunate experiences of the 
1970s, but equally so to the fear of losing mandates. Secondly, the timing 
was extremely tight and politically very unfortunate. The framework for 
voluntary mergers was issued in 2010 and the councils had to decide on a 
merger as early as in 2011. Moreover, this framework came during the full 
run-up to the local elections of October 2012, a particularly unfortunate 
moment to advocate for municipal mergers. Also, the subject was not an 
element of debate during the election campaign of 2012. Thirdly, there 
is insufficient knowledge locally about the benefits of a merger, or the 
potential of any economies of scale. Note that if local politicians do not 
know these advantages, it will be very difficult to convince the population. 
Finally, there are also several organisational aspects that partly explain the 
lack of new mergers. So far, many questions have remained unanswered; 
for example, what to do with the official degrees6 in the new municipali-
ties, how to tackle distribution issues, and so on.
5 The VVSG is the Vereniging van Vlaamse steden en gemeenten, the Association of 
Flemish Cities and Municipalities.
6 Official degrees are the municipal secretary (the highest local officer) and the local 
financial manager. 
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4.  Towards a Multiple Approach of Scale and 
Decentralisation 
The fact that there were no municipal amalgamations during the previous 
Flemish legislature period does not mean that the policy has failed in 
this regard. At least the debate is being conducted again, and this means 
something in Flanders, where this subject has always been largely taboo. 
Moreover, it will take time to convince everyone of the benefits associated 
with a merger. In this respect it is important to know the plans of the new 
Flemish government that came into power in 2014.
The Flemish coalition agreement of 2014 was achieved under special cir-
cumstances. There was the effect of the sixth state reform, which trans-
ferred a number of new competences to the Flemish government, and 
there was the tight budgetary framework, which made  it necessary to 
make some important choices. This tight budgetary framework has also 
affected the local level. Local finances have been under severe pressure in 
recent years. This has multiple causes: personnel and pension expenses, 
loss of dividends, and rising costs for police and firefighters. The question 
has to be asked to what extent local governments have the adequate re-
sources and administrative capacity to meet the many tasks they have to 
fulfil. The precarious financial situation, partly due to the economic crisis, 
of several local governments has made that question only  more pertinent. 
An important part of the revenues of Flemish municipalities is formed 
by an additional rate on the federal income tax. These resources have de-
clined since 2008 and the beginning of the financial and economic crisis.
The Flemish coalition agreement of 2014-2019 clearly shows continuity in 
its approach towards the local level compared with the previous legislative 
term (Vlaamse regering, 2014). The focus lies on strong cities and munic-
ipalities on the one hand, and a general role for the Flemish government 
itself on the other hand. The provinces will be downsized further and they 
will lose all person-tied competences and even their ground-tied compe-
tences in cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants.
Some of these powers will be decentralised towards local authorities. In 
that sense, a serious decentralisation movement is part of the current 
Flemish coalition agreement. This is based on the fact that local authori-
ties are the first point of contact for citizens and moreover are accountable 
to their own local democracy. There will also be differentiation according 
to the scale of local authorities. The largest cities (100,000+) will get the 
opportunity to deviate from Flemish legislation, if they can explain this 
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from an efficiency standpoint or from the metropolitan context in which 
they operate, and insofar as this is consistent with the applicable Euro-
pean directives and regulations. However, even medium-sized municipal-
ities (25,000+) will be able to obtain additional competences if they ask 
for this.
The increased policy autonomy which is mentioned in the coalition agree-
ment becomes clear in the reform of the financing of local governments. 
Many sectoral subsidies (in the fields of culture, youth, sport, education, 
community development, and child poverty) will disappear and be inte-
grated into the municipal fund. This is a general fund managed by the 
Flemish government, which provides the municipalities with financial 
means which they can spend with full autonomy. This means that the pol-
icy autonomy of the local authorities increases, because from now on they 
have larger autonomy in deciding how to spend these funds.
The policy declaration of Minister Homans, who is responsible for local 
and provincial authorities, shows that the government wants to invest in 
further strengthening the capacities of local authorities (Homans, 2014). 
The aspects of scale and decentralisation both play an important role in 
this respect. Two important measures illustrate this, more specifically the 
encouragement of voluntary amalgamations and the stimulation of re-
gional cooperation. We discuss both in detail below.
4.1.  Stimulation of Voluntary Amalgamations of 
Municipalities
One of the operational objectives in the policy declaration of Minister 
Homans says: “the encouragement of voluntary amalgamations of mu-
nicipalities”. In this respect, the minister clearly expands on the work that 
began during the previous Flemish legislature. The minister acknowledg-
es that the policy during the last legislature did not lead to concrete re-
sults, but at least the debate about amalgamations is again on the political 
agenda. Moreover, a number of municipalities are faced with a lack of 
administrative capacity and this in a context of increasing demands from 
the population, increasing tasks, and a rising complexity and technicality 
of tasks.
To stimulate the municipalities to merge, the minister created some in-
struments. We briefly take a closer look at them:
A ‘power monitor’ was created in 2015. The result of such a monitor (an 
instrument that has already existed for many years in the Netherlands) 
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provides municipalities with an objective view of their own abilities and 
capabilities. Although it is not intended to oblige the municipalities to 
merge, it does give an indication of where a local authority stands and 
what can possibly be done better. It stimulates local authorities to ques-
tion themselves and make adjustments where necessary.
The detailed framework to stimulate voluntary mergers developed dur-
ing the previous Flemish legislature will be maintained and even slightly 
extended. In 2015 the minister developed a financial bonus and a decree 
that regulates the modalities of a possible amalgamation. Financial sup-
port will also be interpreted more broadly than simply a financial bonus. 
The minister will investigate if the Flemish government can take over fi-
nancial debts from the municipalities. Moreover, the legal and adminis-
trative support developed during the previous Flemish legislature remains 
preserved.
A final incentive consists of granting additional powers to the amalgamat-
ed municipalities. The Flemish policy in the coming years has the inten-
tion to decentralise tasks to local authorities, but as has already been men-
tioned, this is related to the aspect of scale. Only medium-sized (25,000+) 
and large municipalities (100,000+) will be able to count on these addi-
tional responsibilities.
4.2.  Stimulation of Regional Cooperation
The fact that Flemish municipalities work together is not a new phenome-
non. In recent decades, however, there has been an exponential growth of 
this cooperation, which raises the question whether all this leads to great-
er efficiency, or rather a loss of control for the local councils. Many local 
councillors indicate that it has become difficult for them to follow up all 
these initiatives. Indeed, there is a danger that too much intermunicipal 
cooperation will ultimately lead to what can be called an ‘appearance of 
independence’. Many decisions are indeed taken  in other forums and, as 
a result, the city council with its directly elected representatives is placed 
out of the game.
These findings are not new and were already formulated during the previ-
ous Flemish policy period, in which the instrument of ‘regional screenings’ 
was introduced. The screenings are a way of exploring the many regional 
structures per region and formulating possible solutions for this extreme 
complexity. The approach per region has enabled a customised explo-
ration of the problem, as each region has different characteristics. The 
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regional screenings were rolled out in several phases. In the first phase, an 
inventory was drawn up of the many structures per region. This inventory 
was completed in 2012 and served as a ‘starter’ for the debate at local and 
regional level.
The second phase of the screenings consisted of an audit and evaluation 
of the data collected in the first phase. In this phase the problems were 
actually identified and the search for a possible solution started. The gov-
ernors were appointed as commissioners of the Flemish government to 
organise and support this process. The governors finally prepared a report 
for each province, in which concrete measures were proposed to weak-
en the administrative burden. In the final phase, concrete actions and 
measures were to be implemented. Multiple elements can be part of this 
phase, such as the abolition of certain forms of cooperation, the clustering 
of cooperation, mergers of municipalities, the modification of Flemish 
legislation, and so on.
In her policy declaration the minister proposes a follow-up to the regional 
screenings. The objectives remain the same as those during the previous 
legislature, namely reducing the complexity of regional cooperation in its 
current form. However, municipalities should do as much as possible to 
work together on a regional scale. All forms of intermunicipal cooperation 
should be concentrated in one region to the extent that this is possible. 
How that region is defined is up to the municipalities involved.
To achieve this, the minister wants to encourage municipalities to cluster 
their cooperation at the regional level, in the belief that defining clusters 
in which the municipalities and other partners work together will enhance 
transparency. The minister will develop a framework for this by decree, in 
order to determine the guidelines for optimal regional cooperation.
It remains to be seen in what way these plans will be realised in reality. 
The clustering of intermunicipal cooperation in regional associations may 
sound tempting, but it will take a lot of political and legal thinking to or-
ganise this. The many intermediate structures differ dramatically in terms 
of composition, scope, funding, and so on. Furthermore, this requires a 
change in thinking not only at the local level, but also at the Flemish level. 
Considerable restraint will be required on part of the Flemish administra-
tion in imposing new partnerships onto the local level: something that was 
recognised in the coalition agreement.
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5.  Comparative Experiences 
Many of the debates that have taken place in Flanders in recent years 
have also been on the political agenda in several other European coun-
tries. The issues of scale, decentralisation, and the relationships between 
different layers of government have dominated the debate in many coun-
tries. The Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark have extensive experi-
ence with municipal mergers, decentralisation, and reforms at the local 
level. The same debate was also on the agenda in France, however, with a 
fundamentally different result. We briefly discuss those countries before 
we draw some lessons for Flanders.7
5.1.  Denmark
In the literature there is agreement that the reform operation that Den-
mark has carried out in recent years can be seen as a successful scale 
reform. That became clear recently in the Netherlands, where the report 
entitled Modernisation of the Administrative Structure of the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations (MBZK, 2013) referred to Denmark as an 
example of a successful reform. Klaartje Peeters (2013) lists several rea-
sons for this, the most interesting being the decision on the administrative 
reform itself. Certainly the control of that decision by the national gov-
ernment can be seen as a success. Firstly, the government made good use 
of the conditions. Although no planned amalgamation of municipalities 
was forthcoming, the government made use of a policy window that came 
up in the summer of 2002. Furthermore, opposition was discouraged and 
support welcomed. Moreover, the operation was also accompanied by 
strong policy entrepreneurship. Here a large role was played by the Inte-
rior Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, who travelled around the country to 
convince people of the inevitability of the reforms.
Only seven municipalities (including five small island municipalities) ul-
timately did not meet the conditions imposed by the government. All the 
other Danish municipalities found one or more amalgamation partners. 
According to Peeters, several lessons can be drawn from this:
The ‘robbery technique’ worked. The municipalities had insufficient time 
to respond or prevent the process. They received only six months from 
7 In this part we refer to a report published in the context of a research project of the 
Policy Research Centre (De Ceuninck, Steyvers, 2014) 
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the government to find a partner: something at which the vast majority of 
municipalities were successful.
In addition to this there was also very intense time pressure. The result of 
this tight schedule was that the municipalities immediately searched for 
amalgamation partners, in the fear of being left behind or ending up in a 
forced amalgamation.
Reform is easier in prosperous times. The municipalities in Denmark re-
ceived no financial incentives to merge. But in that particular period the 
Danish economy was doing well, and as a result so were public finances 
in general.
Citizens were involved in the amalgamation process. This was done 
through public consultations that were carried out by citizens in 63 mu-
nicipalities. A striking fact was that most people were not against the 
amalgamations as such, but opted for a different amalgamation partner 
than the one the local politicians had chosen initially. In the majority of 
municipalities the decision of the municipal councils was followed; there-
fore no citizen consultation was necessary.
Peeters concludes by saying that it is good to have a vision of reforms, but 
at a certain moment, while implementing scale reforms, one has to make a 
decision. Moreover, according to Peeters, there is nothing wrong with the 
implementation of scale reforms from above, as long as they are designed 
bottom-up. The Danish case is a good example of this. The decision to 
merge was taken by the central government at the central level, but the 
municipalities could choose with whom they merged. The Danish case also 
shows that reform is easier in financially favourable times and that local pol-
iticians attach more importance to small communities than the population.
At the same time Peeters points out that a reduction in the number of mu-
nicipalities through municipal amalgamations does not necessarily lead to 
less administrative pressure. As long as responsibilities and powers remain 
divided over several layers of government, coordination and harmonisation 
problems remain. The latter, however, can be reduced in a context of re-
gions with a closed list of tasks that goes hand in hand with a decentralisa-
tion operation in favour of the municipalities, as is the case in Denmark.
5.2.  The Netherlands
The Netherlands, a country that has traditionally often served as a refer-
ence point for Flanders, has a long history when it comes to municipal 
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amalgamations and decentralisation. Amalgamations took place practi-
cally annually and over the years they have reduced the number of Dutch 
municipalities from 1,121 in 1900 to 393 on 1 January 2015. For many 
years, the number of inhabitants of a municipality served as a guideline to 
justify an amalgamation. It was assumed that small municipalities would 
be naturally stronger if they merged. Since the 1980s questions have been 
raised regarding this policy. The scale criterion faded into the background 
to make way for what was called ‘the problem approach’. This approach 
referred to certain administrative problems to which amalgamations could 
be a solution. From then on, a merger was only accepted if it was proven 
that it would provide a solution to these problems. 
From 2002, with the arrival of the Balkenende Cabinet, the focus of the 
amalgamation policy changed again. The top-down approach that had 
been almost the norm until then was replaced by a bottom-up approach. 
Henceforth mergers had to come from the municipalities themselves. In 
that respect, amalgamations were left to the municipal and provincial gov-
ernments. From now on there had to be at least a form of local support 
for the reform and the provincial governments often played a facilitating 
role. The arrival of the Rutte II Cabinet in 2012 resulted in an enforce-
ment of the amalgamation and decentralisation policy at the local level. In 
the coalition agreement the political partners stated that from now on, all 
new municipalities should have at least 100,000 inhabitants. In this way, 
the population criterion reappeared on the political agenda. According 
to the government, those larger municipalities are necessary to arm the 
municipalities to take on additional tasks that the government wants to 
decentralise in their direction.
This shift of responsibilities and tasks to the local authorities is not a re-
cent phenomenon in the Netherlands. Since the 1980s, decentralisation 
movements have gone hand in hand with the amalgamation policy. This 
is something we have also seen more recently in Denmark. As a result, 
Dutch local authorities have become a major partner for the implemen-
tation of (national) government policy. Even if this often involves co-ad-
ministration tasks, the (sometimes supposed) inability to take up new 
government tasks forms an important incentive for new mergers. These 
decentralisations mainly occur in the field of social legislation and wel-
fare. Also during the current Rutte Cabinet a lot of new tasks have been 
decentralised from the central government to the municipalities. In that 
respect we refer to a lot of welfare responsibilities in the context of the 
Social Support Act (WMO).
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The federal structure of Germany and the reunification of 1990 have 
ensured that the scale debate was conducted differently in the various 
Länder and led to different results. The former West Germany had already 
been confronted with amalgamations in the 1960s and 1970s, while East 
Germany had to wait until after German unification before a similar pro-
cess started.
The amalgamations in West Germany emerged largely because of the 
classic argument, namely a lack of scale for local authorities. It was the 
by now familiar ‘carrot and stick’ approach that was implemented. First 
there was a period of voluntary mergers, giving local governments time to 
amalgamate. This went hand in hand with efforts towards public partici-
pation, but nothing more than hearings or the installation of an advising 
commission. In most Länder this approach did not lead to a satisfactory 
outcome. The result was almost always that they switched to compulsory 
amalgamations imposed by the parliaments of the different Länder.
East Germany followed an identical path from 1990 onwards. Several 
Länder adopted legislation in order to reduce the number of municipali-
ties. It should be noted that the second layer of government (the German 
districts or Kreise) were also involved in those reforms. In several states 
they were merged exactly like the municipalities.
For several years, Germany has been confronted with a third wave of scale 
reforms in both the former East and West German states. That has partly 
to do with the declining number of inhabitants of rural communities, a 
problem that is manifested primarily in the former East German states. 
Yet initiatives have also recently been launched in the former West Ger-
man Länder to rethink the scale of local government. Since 2010 there has 
been an ongoing reform in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate (located in 
the west of Germany) in order to reform the districts on a larger scale. The 
authorities are making efforts to create support among the population for 
those reforms. These efforts go far beyond the obligatory debate in the city 
council or a possible referendum. Regional conferences with politicians, 
experts, and citizens have been organised, and in addition appointed ju-
ries made up of citizens have been invited to announce their expectations 
of the reforms. Moreover, online surveys have been organised. This shows 
that it is possible to work actively towards a platform (and support) for 
scale reforms. Indeed, the latter is often lacking, which makes it difficult 
to find support for scale reforms among local politicians and the public.
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Since the 1970s efforts have been made to implement reforms at the local 
government level in France. In the 1970s there were even attempts to 
amalgamate French municipalities. However, these attempts never suc-
ceeded and, as a result, the situation remains unchanged. This had to do 
with the fierce resistance that was offered by local politicians at higher lev-
els of government. Both nationally, and in the departments and regions, 
local representatives have always been opposed to scale reforms of local 
government. The accumulation of political mandates in France is, after 
all, a widespread phenomenon. As a result, an objective alliance emerged 
at the party boundaries of cumulards forming a conservative lobby against 
meaningful changes to the subnational government structure.
The lack of mergers has ensured that in order to shape policy in France, 
the instrument of intermunicipal cooperation became very popular. This 
has led to a proliferation of partnerships that have only increased admin-
istrative and political fragmentation. It took until the 1990s before it was 
recognised that there was a need to bring some order to this complex 
local landscape. The creation of the communautés in 1999 was the first 
step towards the simplification of the administrative landscape because all 
existing forms of intermunicipal cooperation that raised their own taxes 
were forced to transform themselves into one of the three types of com-
munautés.8
A committee headed by former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur formu-
lated in 2009 several proposals to further reform the French administrative 
landscape. Many of these proposals (including the stimulation of munici-
pal amalgamations and a reform of the communautés to full municipalities) 
ultimately did not make it into legislation or specific policy initiatives. 
Both in 2010 and 2013 several legislative initiatives were approved, how-
ever, to reform at least parts of the governmental organisation. The legis-
lation from 2010 ensured that municipal amalgamations were encouraged 
but without any incentives. The legislation from 2013 introduced several 
reforms to the local electoral system and provided a new statute for met-
ropolitan areas. From now on, the French people can elect some of their 
municipal representatives in intercommunal bodies directly. The second 
major reform, the creation of a metropolitan government in the biggest 
8  We distinguish between communautés de communes in rural areas, communautés 
d’agglomération around small urban areas, and communautés urbaine in a metropolitan con-
text.
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French cities (those with more than 450,000 inhabitants), was the subject 
of a whole debate. A special status was created for those metropolitan ar-
eas that received all the powers they need to play their role. Notably, the 
new administrations take over the role of the former departments where 
they are created, whose responsibilities they assume fully.
5.5.  Lessons for Flanders
Several lessons can be drawn from these foreign experiences for the Flem-
ish situation. Those lessons may inspire the scale and merger debate in 
Flanders and abroad.
Amalgamations are a way of increasing local administrative power, not an end 
in itself. The first lesson we draw from these different cases and the liter-
ature is probably one of the most important aspects in the amalgamation 
debate, or more precisely the ‘why’ question. Those who advocate new 
amalgamations must make clear why these are necessary and to which 
administrative problems they can be a solution. In other words, the added 
value must be clearly demonstrated. In the Netherlands the policy is very 
consistent in that regard. The amalgamation policy is linked to a strong 
decentralisation policy. A decentralisation of competences to the local 
level goes hand in hand with a larger scale. In that sense, amalgamations 
are seen as a means; they are not an end in itself. Also, in Denmark the 
strengthening of the local level and the expansion of its competences were 
arguments in favour of amalgamations. Mergers should therefore be seen 
as a way of increasing local government capacity and opening the path 
towards a wider range of tasks for local governments. The question that 
should be central is the one about what kind of municipalities we want. 
When there is a choice for strong local governments with an extended list 
of competences, then amalgamations can be a way of achieving that goal.
Create strong policy entrepreneurship. It has become clear that the imple-
mentation of reforms and amalgamations in particular is not easy. Who-
ever takes a decision to implement such kind of reforms will face a lot 
of resistance and will therefore have to be prepared to sail against the 
tide. Consequently, strong policy entrepreneurship will be necessary. If 
the amalgamations in Belgium in the 1970s were smoothly implemented, 
then to a large extent that had to do with the determination of former 
Minister Michel, who was responsible for that operation. A similar finding 
was noted in Denmark, where Minister Rasmussen received praise for the 
way he handled this reform.
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Create political and public support. One of the main causes of the failure of 
voluntary mergers in Flanders is the limited support of local politicians, 
and by extension the population. There is a need to create strong support 
for such kind of reforms, especially if one wants to achieve amalgama-
tions bottom-up. Again, the Netherlands and Denmark can be inspiring. 
In both countries local authorities gained additional powers after amal-
gamation. Also, for local politicians, decentralisation after amalgamation 
can serve as an argument in favour of scale reforms. Strengthening local 
governments financially may also be a way of increasing support among 
local decision-makers.
Nevertheless, foreign examples also teach us that voluntary mergers alone 
are very rare. Some form of compulsory amalgamations will always be 
necessary. Again, Denmark delivers relevant experience here. The deci-
sion to merge was taken centrally but local municipalities were given the 
freedom to choose their partner. This process can also be called ‘steered 
voluntariness’. Leaving some room for local decision-makers can help to 
strengthen their support for the process.
Measure the strength of municipalities. The Netherlands has been working for 
several years with instruments that measure how strong a municipality re-
ally is. This means trying to determine the extent to, and manner in which, 
a municipality can realise its tasks. These instruments clearly explain the 
strengths and the weaknesses exposed in the municipal organisation. In this 
way they help municipalities to compare themselves with other municipali-
ties. Moreover, these instruments should be seen as a learning process. The 
results of such an exercise help to objectify the scale debate.
So far, Flanders has had only limited experience with such instruments. 
The instrument of the ‘city monitor’ perhaps comes closest to this. A 
large-scale measurement of the strength of municipalities in Flanders has 
not yet been implemented. That last aspect will probably change, since 
the current Minister Homans proposed such a monitor in June 2015.
Create a clear procedure for municipal amalgamations. Once the decision 
to amalgamate has been taken, it is necessary to have a clear procedure 
to merge municipalities. In reality those procedures tend to vary quite 
considerably: from a purely legal method, to methods with a large par-
ticipation of local authorities, to methods where the central government 
in particular has a big say. In some procedures there is also room for the 
opinion of the people through plebiscites or other participation meth-
ods. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. Yet Paddison 
stressed that redrawing the local administrative landscape is not a matter 
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of local politicians alone (2004): ‘Political bias will tend to dominate how 
the reform process is conducted’. The danger of political interference and 
the redrawing of municipal boundaries in function of their own (political) 
interest soon comes into play. According to him, municipal mergers are 
therefore best performed by a healthy combination of both local and na-
tional politicians.
Paddison formulates three conditions that contribute to the successful 
implementation of scale reforms:
Amalgamations must be an answer to local problems and needs. Moreo-
ver, the new municipalities need a scale that is still connected to the local 
community. Excessive local governments are best avoided.
Mergers should be implemented in a transparent, fair, and open way. 
The decision must therefore provide adequate opportunities for the pub-
lic participation of local and central decision-makers and the population 
concerned.
The final outcome must always be a compromise between local and cen-
tral politicians. The decision on new municipal boundaries may never ex-
clusively be decided by local or central decision-makers.
6.  Conclusion
It is good that the debate on scale and decentralisation is back on the po-
litical agenda in Flanders. It is also positive to see that the Flemish govern-
ment wants to learn from past experiences with scale reforms. The policy 
that was initiated during the previous Flemish legislature is continued and 
even reinforced in the current legislature. In that respect, we see that the 
policy on amalgamations is now linked to decentralisation towards the local 
authorities. This can only help to strengthen the support for scale reforms.
However, it has to be said that amalgamations are not the only way of 
enhancing local administrative power. Administrative power is deter-
mined by more than scale; i.e. by the legal framework in which local gov-
ernments operate, their funding, their (political) composition, and their 
geographical location, among other factors. All these aspects determine 
local administrative power in one way or another. Strengthening the ad-
ministrative power can therefore only be achieved by a multiple approach, 
whereby several of these factors are tackled simultaneously. Therefore, 
amalgamations should be framed by a series of other measures if one 
wants to fundamentally strengthen local administrative power.
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Finally, some foreign examples teach us that scale reforms certainly have 
their use, and that it is possible to create a platform for them both among 
the local politicians and the population.
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CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS IN FLANDERS: STRUCTURAL 
REFORMS, SCALE AND DECENTRALISATION
Summary
In this article central-local relations in the Belgian region of Flanders are the 
subject of investigation. In recent years, the scale of the municipalities, their 
competences, and the way they work together in inter-municipal bodies has been 
the subject of many debates. This article starts with a brief historical overview. In 
the ’60s and ‘70s, Belgian municipalities were confronted with a far-reaching 
amalgamation operation which reduced their number from more than 2,000 to 
the current 589 municipalities. For many years, political calm was achieved. 
However, in the Dutch-speaking part of the country, debates about how to or-
ganise the internal state architecture were never far away. In this contribution 
the several and successive attempts to organise a structural dialogue between 
the Flemish government and the 308 municipalities in Flanders are presented 
briefly. Secondly, the authors address the policy of the current Flemish govern-
ment towards their municipalities. More than before, the scale of the latter is 
questioned again. Additional competences for the municipalities are used as 
a reward and a trigger to convince the municipalities to merge, in addition to 
financial incentives. So far, however, this policy has been unsuccessful. There is 
hardly any support among local politicians for voluntary mergers. In this article 
some foreign examples of reforms of scale are mentioned. They can serve as inspi-
ration pools and several lessons can be drawn from them that are also applicable 
in Flanders and beyond. 
Keywords: local government, scale, decentralisation, central-local relations, 
amalgamations
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SREDIŠNJE-LOKALNI ODNOSI U FLAMANSKOJ: STRUKTURNE 
REFORME, VELIČINA JEDINICA I DECENTRALIZACIJA
Sažetak
U radu se istražuju odnosi između središnje i lokalne uprave u belgijskoj regiji 
Flandriji. Posljednjih godina često se raspravljalo o veličini općina, njihovim 
nadležnostima i načinu na koji surađuju u međuopćinskim tijelima. Započinje 
se kratkim povijesnim pregledom. Belgijske su se regije tijekom 1960-ih i 1970-
ih suočile s opsežnom operacijom amalgamacije kojom se smanjio njihov broj 
s više od 2.000 na sadašnjih 589 općina. Postignuto je političko primirje koje 
je trajalo više godina, no na nizozemskom govornom području zemlje rasprave 
o organizaciji unutarnjeg ustrojstva države nikada nisu prestale. U radu se 
ukratko opisuju mnogobrojni pokušaji postizanja strukturnog dijaloga između 
flamanskih vlasti i 308 flamanskih općina. Nakon toga slijedi osvrt na politi-
ku trenutnih flamanskih vlasti prema općinama. Veličina općina se ponovno 
preispituje i više nego što je to prije bio slučaj. Dodjela dodatnih nadležnosti 
općinama služi kao nagrada i poticaj općinama na spajanje, uz financijske 
poticaje. Ipak, zasad se ova politika pokazala neuspješnom. Lokalni političari 
gotovo uopće ne podržavaju dobrovoljno spajanje. U radu se spominju primjeri 
drugih zemalja koje su provele teritorijalne reforme. Ti primjeri mogu poslužiti 
kao inspiracija i iz njih se mogu izvući pouke primjenjive u Flandriji i drugdje.
Ključne riječi: lokalna uprava, veličina lokalnih jedinica, decentralizacija, 
središnje-lokalni odnosi, spajanja jedinica
